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a b s t r a c t 
Cybercrime and economic espionage are increasing problems for ﬁrms. We build on US FBI policy to 
frame the interaction between a cybercrime victim ﬁrm and a government security agency. We bring 
together several strands in the literature to model the strategies of the ﬁrm, which has suffered a cy- 
ber breach and theft of trade secrets, and the government security agency, which must investigate and 
prosecute crimes. We investigate the interactions between these two players, in which the ﬁrm has pri- 
vate information about its cybersecurity investment. This investment level is unknown to the security 
agency, which must nonetheless decide how to prioritize reported crime. We model this asymmetric in- 
formation problem within a game theoretic signaling framework derived from Becker’s work in crime and 
punishment. We suggest that such a framework can inform policy to encourage security investments by 
ﬁrms and more eﬃcient resource utilization by security agencies. We particularly focus on an illustrative 
stylized example to highlight how our modelling approach can be helpful. In this example we compare 
two worlds; one where all security breaches become public knowledge and another where only reported 
breaches become public knowledge. We then formulate two potentially testable Hypotheses and several 
implications of these Hypotheses. Case studies and a policy analysis further highlight how our framework 
plays out in reality. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
1. Introduction 
For more than a decade, malicious actors have conducted cyber 
intrusions into United States commercial networks, targeting con- 
ﬁdential business information held by American ﬁrms. Malicious 
cyber actors from other nations have stolen troves of trade secrets, 
technical data, and sensitive proprietary internal communications 
( Government of the United States, 2018 ). 
Headline ﬁgures suggest that the theft of trade secrets 1 costs 
the world’s economies between one and three per cent of GDP an- 
✩ Searle’s participation is supported by the Engineering & Physical Science Re- 
search Council ( EPSRC ) Grant EP/P005039/1 , Economic Espionage and Cybercrime: 
Evidence and Strategy. 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: n.searle@gold.ac.uk (N. Searle). 
1 A trade secret, which is a type of intellectual property, must meet the following 
criteria: (1) it must be secret, (2) it must have commercial value because of its 
secrecy, and (3) it must be subject to reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy. This 
paper focuses on two criminal aspects of trade secret misappropriation — the theft 
of trade secrets, and the theft of trade secrets to beneﬁt a foreign entity, commonly 
known as economic espionage. 
nually. 2 Unseen in the cyber world, criminals may target the crown 
jewels of a ﬁrm’s intellectual assets. Firms and governments in- 
creasingly view trade secrets as important assets and cyber secu- 
rity as a key component of protection. However, researchers and 
practitioners alike do not have a clear understanding of the in- 
terrelated decision making process that determines whether ﬁrms 
report a theft, how government agencies assign resources in re- 
sponding to a report, and how ﬁrms determine investments in pri- 
vate protection. There appears to be no analytical framework to 
address the interplay between ﬁrms, cyber security, 3 and the gov- 
ernment security agencies tasked with protecting trade secrets and 
prosecuting their theft. We seek to address this gap in this pa- 
per. First, we discuss the literature that brings together different 
investigative concerns to connect the economic roles of trade 
2 The Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade (CREATe.org) and PWC (2014) 
“Economic Impact of Trade Secret Theft,” available at: http://www.pwc.com/us/en/ 
forensic- services/publications/economic- impact.html . This estimate calculated for 
top 40 economies using a combination of R&D spending and white collar crime 
as proxies. 
3 We use ‘cybersecurity’ as a term used to complement ‘cybercrime’; ‘information 
security’ is another option to describe security for information assets ( Von Solms 
and Van Niekerk, 2013 ). 
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secret theft, cyber security and cybercrime. Second, we develop a 
conceptual framework which adapt the economics of crime to cy- 
bercrime and trade secrets theft, and explore this framework via a 
game theoretic model to capture complex contextual realities. 
The next section provides a literature review; we then proceed 
to develop and analyze our model and its ﬁrm behavior and policy 
implications; our ﬁnal section concludes and points to future areas 
of research. 
2. Prior literature 
Academic analysis has addressed the economic roles of trade 
secret theft, cyber security and cybercrime as separate themes, but 
crossover is relatively recent. In this section, we bring together four 
research strands relevant to our paper. 
2.1. Vulnerable assets 
The same technologies that have been a catalyst to the eco- 
nomic growth of both businesses and economies have created a 
new and threatening environment for the protection of vital as- 
sets. These new technologies make it easier to store, access, dis- 
seminate, and publish conﬁdential information, thereby enhancing 
the likelihood that a trade secret may be lost ( Goverment of the 
United States, 2013 ). 
Trade secrets theft and cybercrime are closely related. While 
digital technologies have led to a boon for innovation and in- 
formation management, intangible assets have simultaneously be- 
come more vulnerable. Digital assets include core value assets (e.g., 
intellectual property [IP], data, customer records, security infor- 
mation), and operational assets (e.g., business critical IT services) 
( Ruan, 2017 ). Trade secrecy can protect core value assets: trade se- 
crets law helps address vulnerabilities 4 by providing legal protec- 
tion for these digital assets; cyber security provides business criti- 
cal, practical protection. 
Governments are reacting to these challenges. The US gov- 
ernment describes growing threats, “[competitors and adversaries 
are] engaging in pernicious economic espionage and malicious cy- 
ber activities, causing signiﬁcant economic disruption and harm…”
( Government of the United States, 2018 : 1). In parallel to cyber 
policies, the US has sought to bolster legal support of trade secrets. 
Recent trade secrets debates have had a ‘war narrative’ ( Rowe, 
2016 ) in treating theft of trade secrets as a national security threat 
and US ﬁrms as potential allies ( Dreyfuss and Lobel, 2016 ). 
A ﬁrm’s use of trade secrets is a strategic decision. In order to 
maintain a competitive advantage and protect innovations, ﬁrms 
must consider IP mechanisms to control use of their knowledge. 
Trade secrets, unlike other IP, do not require a formal registration 
process, potentially last forever, protect a broad class of informa- 
tion, and do not require disclosure. The wide scope of trade se- 
crets means that ﬁrms can protect assets from customer lists to 
prototypes. Even failures, such as software vulnerabilities and un- 
successful scientiﬁc trials, qualify as trade secrets. A disadvantage 
of using trade secrets as a protection mechanism is that their se- 
crecy is fundamental for their use; once made public, the trade se- 
cret is no longer a trade secret both in practical and legal terms. 
Good cyber security and legal controls such as contracts mitigate 
the risk of theft. 
Firms have alternatives to trade secrets as legal and strategic 
mechanisms. In lieu of trade secrets, ﬁrms may choose to patent 
(e.g., Bhattacharya and Guriev, 2006 ; Bulut and Moschini, 2006 ; 
Cugno and Ottoz, 2006; Ottoz and Cugno, 2007 ; Kultti et al., 2007 ; 
4 Trade secrets as a means of appropriation are also vulnerable to reverse engi- 
neering and independent discovery. This paper focuses on theft as vulnerability. 
Mosel, 2011 ; Kwon, 2012 ; Panagopoulos and Park, 2015 ). However, 
patents may provide shorter-term and expensive protection, and 
also involve making more information public, which can lead to 
the loss of a competitive advantage. Trade secrets can be a supe- 
rior IP protection mechanism; limited empirical evidence suggests 
that trade secrets are preferred over other types of IP ( see Cohen 
et al., 20 0 0; Arundel, 20 01; Anton and Yao 2004; Png et al., 2006; 
Crass et al., 2016; Png and Samila 2013; Png 2017a, 2017b ). 5 Cyber 
security plays a small role in other IP, such as the use of technical 
protection measures to control copyrighted material, but is funda- 
mental to the protection of trade secrets. 
2.2. Costs and impact 
Trade secret theft is costly to the ﬁrm; to mitigate or prevent 
thefts, the ﬁrm must invest in cyber security. Weighing the risks, 
costs, and beneﬁts of cyber security and trade secrecy is important 
for ﬁrm decision-making and for academic analysis. Yet quantifying 
these elements is not straightforward. 
For the legal protection of core value assets, trade secrecy 
is a lower cost approach than other IP. 6 However, it is unclear 
whether this remains true in the era of cybercrime as, in order 
to qualify for trade secrecy, the trade secret must be subject to a 
threshold of ‘reasonable protection’. What qualiﬁes as reasonable 
at one point may quickly become outdated as technology moves 
on Cash (2015) . Effective cyber security may need frequent invest- 
ments. ‘Loss of conﬁdential data’ is a central risk included in secu- 
rity decision making ( Moore et al., 2015 ). The classic Gordon and 
Loeb (2002) model argues that security investments exhibit de- 
creasing marginal returns and limited security investment is jus- 
tiﬁed for very low or very high vulnerabilities. In cases of widely 
known information, such as the possible sale of a business unit, 
the costs to protect information can be prohibitively expense. As a 
implication, the authors argue that the focus should not be on the 
vulnerability of the asset, but “the reduction in expected loss with 
the investment.” Gordon and Loeb (2002, p. 450.) 
Appraising the correct level of protection is diﬃcult. 
Gordon and Loeb (2002) ﬁnd the optimal investment in infor- 
mation security is less than or equal to 37% of the expected loss of 
unprotected assets. Lagazio et al. (2014) suggest that ﬁrms in the 
ﬁnancial sector invest approximately one-to-two percent of their 
IT budget in security. Investment is increasing ( Moore et al. 2015 ). 
A 2016 industry estimate ﬁnds ﬁrms spend 5.6% of their IT budget 
on security and risk management ( McMillan and Olyaei, 2016 ). 
The intangibility and uncertainty of protection thwarts valuing 
the returns to investment in security and the expected loss of a 
trade secrets theft. Informed risk-assessment for ﬁrms is com- 
promised by insuﬃcient quantitative information ( Ruan, 2017 ). 
Compounded by fast-changing technologies and cyberthreats, 
optimizing security investment levels remains a challenge. 
Cybercrime can be costly to the ﬁrm. Data loss (the loss of con- 
ﬁdential data and trade secrets) is a key business cost following 
a successful attack ( Wei et al., 2005 ). Data loss reduces competi- 
tiveness due to compromised IP becoming available to competitors 
( Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Anderson et al., 2013 ; and Lagazio et al., 
2014 ). IP theft can have longer-term, insidious impacts on ﬁrms 
compared to short-lived cyber attacks such as denial of service 
( Andrijcic and Horowitz, 2006 ). This suggests that IP theft repre- 
sents an important strategic concern for the ﬁrm, in keeping with 
policy concerns described earlier. 
5 See Hall et al. (2014) for a literature review of theoretical and empirical trade 
secrets research. 
6 Not all core value assets can be covered by other types of IP; trade secrecy 
covers a broader scope. Copyright is another low cost option but has a narrower 
scope than trade secrets. 
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There is limited empirical evidence of expected losses, despite 
the threats posed. The announcement of the theft of trade secrets 
or internet security breach negatively impacts a ﬁrm’s stock mar- 
ket price ( Carr and Gorman, 2001 ; Cavusoglu et al., 2004 ). While 
Carr and Gorman (2001) and Andrijcic and Horowitz (2006) note 
the negative impact of IP theft on ﬁrm performance, the impact of 
other types of security breaches is inconsistent and sometimes sur- 
prisingly short-term or negligible. Acquisti et al. (2006) ﬁnd that 
the negative stock market impact of data breaches is statistically 
signiﬁcant but short-lived, but note that the indirect damage to 
goodwill, and higher insurance premiums may harm ﬁrm perfor- 
mance. Similarly, Davis et al. (2009) ﬁnd evidence that cyber se- 
curity incidents such as data breaches do not impact web traﬃc 
for online businesses, and argue it is therefore diﬃcult for policy 
makers to encourage investment in cyber security. The impact may 
be changing. Gordon et al. (2011) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant, negative im- 
pact on stock market prices, but that impact decreases as investors 
lower the expected costs of such breaches. Hilary et al. (2016) ar- 
gue that, “the market reaction to cyber-breaches is statistically sig- 
niﬁcant but economically limited.”7 Arcuri et al. (2017) note that 
literature on the topic has mixed ﬁndings over the previous 20 
years, and ﬁnd in favor of a negative, signiﬁcant stock market re- 
action to announcements of information security breaches. Collec- 
tively, the body of research describes a shifting landscape in which 
ﬁrms face uncertainty in estimating the impact of crime. 
While both the theoretical and empirical literature demonstrate 
the negative impacts of cyber security threats and cybercrime, the 
decision-making for investments remains diﬃcult. A ﬁrm’s choice 
of investing in a high or low security environment is poorly under- 
stood and even the impact of a cyber breach or trade secret loss is 
ambiguous. 
2.3. Government policy and cyber security 
In policy debates, the emphasis is on the economic impact of 
cybercrime, trade secrets, and the immediate need for better cy- 
ber security. Yet interactions between actors are complex in cy- 
ber security ( Basuchoudhary and Choucri, 2014 ). Cyber security is 
a collective good increasing social welfare with signiﬁcant positive 
externalities and, like immunizations, investment in cyber security 
encourages ‘herd immunity’. A ﬁrm’s investment in cyber secu- 
rity has positive externalities and contributes to the wider ecosys- 
tem and security of trade secrets; investment also raises funds for 
software development and increases innovation in the economy 
( Cash, 2015 ). However, aligning the incentives of ﬁrms and gov- 
ernments is challenging. 
Despite the need to focus on collaboration at the system level, 
rather than the individual level ( Andersen and Moore, 2006 ) cy- 
ber security policies and investments are ineﬃcient ( Gordon et al., 
2015a ). For example, Png et al. (2006) argue that an increase in en- 
forcement, leads to a decrease in a ﬁrm’s protection measures and 
an increase in demand for enforcement. A policy solution could be 
government support for training and awareness, which may allow 
ﬁrms to better allocate their cyber security budget ( Gordon et al., 
2015b ). Yet other authors suggest focusing on the user ( Png et al., 
2006, Basuchoudhary and Choucri, 2014 ) rather than on the ﬁrm. 
As policy often lags behind technology, and technology in this 
space is very fast-moving, any policy gains may be short-lived. This 
paper examines a government security agency’s 8 decision-making 
in cybercrime as a policy lever to encourage investment in cyber 
security. 
7 Hilary et al. (2016) , p 4. 
8 The FBI, for example, plays an important role in effecting these policies as a pri- 
mary investigative agency for cybercrimes and is the agency responsible for federal 
investigations of economic espionage. 
2.4. Government policy, investigations and reporting 
Policy is being developed in a vacuum. Government policy 
is shaped by disclosed thefts, not those which go unreported 
( Lagazio et al., 2014 ). The Cyber Strategy ( Government of the 
United States, 2018 , p. 11) acknowledges this, “The prompt report- 
ing of cyber incidents to the Federal Government is essential to 
an effective response, linking related incidents, identiﬁcation of the 
perpetrators, and prevention of future incidents.” Effective govern- 
ment policy is one that addresses the coordination problems asso- 
ciated with disclosure in order to move toward to a socially opti- 
mal equilibrium. Empirical evidence ﬁnds government policies re- 
quiring ﬁrm disclosure of data breaches have reduced the impact 
of breach-related crime ( Romanosky et al., 2011 ). 
While reporting is key to developing good policy and secu- 
rity, the incidence of reporting in practice is generally sub-optimal. 
Firms face risks both in disclosing a trade secret theft (further loss 
of competitive advantage, loss of goodwill, and potential loss of 
trade secrecy) and not disclosing the theft (ethical and legal im- 
plications, establishing a precedent of no implications for theft, 
and forgoing potential damages.) Argento (2013, p. 216) notes, “a 
CSI/FBI survey found that 48% of respondents cited negative pub- 
licity as a reason for not reporting a computer security breach to 
law enforcement.” Firms are also reluctant to admit signiﬁcant ﬁ- 
nancial losses associated with cyber breaches ( Shackelford, 2016 ). 
“The harm of the disclosure, both through publicizing internal vul- 
nerabilities and reputational damage, can be worse that the initial 
attack.”(interviewee, Ettredge et al., 2018 , p. 568) Curiously, ﬁrms 
who disclose the existence of their trade secrets in their ﬁnan- 
cial ﬁlings have a higher probability of subsequent cyber security 
breaches than ﬁrms who do not ( Ettredge et al. 2018 ). 
Yet disclosure, or not, can serve self-interests. Actors have in- 
centives to over or under-report cybercrime ( Moore et al., 2009; 
Anderson et al. 2013 ). For example, ﬁrms specializing in cyber se- 
curity may over-report their successes ( Gordon and Loeb, 2002 ) 
while governments may seek to minimize crime statistics; these 
competing incentives can lead to suboptimal outcomes. However, 
in a repeated game, not disclosing and, as a consequence, not pur- 
suing criminal or civil redress can incentivize crime. This is at odds 
with FBI effort s to improve the protection of trade secrets through 
criminal law; if ﬁrms do not use existing tools, then the deterrent 
effect of the law is weakened. 
The dynamics between ﬁrms and government enforce- 
ment agencies (e.g. the FBI), can create an ‘under-reporting 
loop.’ Using a systems dynamic causal (SDC) approach, 
Lagazio et al. (2014) model how victim ﬁrms chronically under- 
report causing the government to underestimate the extent of 
cybercrime, which reduces the effectiveness of cybercrime polic- 
ing and ultimately leads to a growth in cybercrime incidents. 
Lagazio et al. (2014) link this loop to the ﬁrm’s compromised IP 
and loss of trade secrets, leading to competitive disadvantages, 
and reputational damage. Our framework focuses on these re- 
lationships and the government’s effort s to encourage reporting 
and investment in cyber security. This ‘under-reporting loop’ and 
some related nodes, summarized in Fig. 1 , is the policy and crime 
context in which our analysis sits. 
The question, combining the investigative strands described 
above, then remains – how does a security agency’s decisions to 
investigate a crime interact with a ﬁrm’s decision to report the 
crime and its decision to invest in more security? 
In the following section we develop our conceptual framework 
by structuring this interplay between the government and the 
victim of a cybercrime. We then use this framework to answer 
the question above by comparing two scenarios: one where all 
breaches go public and one where only reported breaches go pub- 
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Fig. 1. Under-reporting loop adapted from Lagazio et al (2014) . 
lic. We then illustrate some of our results with case analyses fol- 
lowed by a policy discussion. 
3. Conceptual framework 
We model a game theoretic interaction between a victim ﬁrm 
and a government security agency, in our case the FBI, to ex- 
plore cases arising from the theft of trade secrets following a cyber 
breach. This model informs our conceptual framework as we better 
understand the ﬁrm’s investment in cyber security, their decision- 
making process in reporting to the FBI, and the FBI’s strategy in 
determining investigations. 
Our choice of game theory as a methodology sits among exist- 
ing applications of the economics of crime theory to cybercrime. 
The classic Beckerian ( Becker, 1968 ) model of crime incorporates 
cost-beneﬁt analyses from the perspective of criminals, victims, 
and society. In this context, the economics of conventional crime 
can be applied to cybercrime, but operate in the relatively un- 
derdeveloped judicial context of cybercrime ( Moore et al., 2009 ). 
Models are important to our chosen topic as empirical evidence is 
not often available for cybercrime ( Lagazio et al., 2014 ) and trade 
secrets ( Hall et al., 2014 ), largely due to data challenges. Existing 
theoretical models provide extensive analysis of user behavior, but 
there is a lack of integrated models that incorporate more types of 
players ( Manshaei et al., 2013 ). The literature has generally focused 
on deterrence in cyber security ( Hua and Bapna, 2013 ), which is 
more effective when the probability of conviction increases, rather 
than the punishment itself ( Becker, 1968 ; Kshetri, 2006 ). Analysis 
of a criminal’s expected utility and a victim’s decision-making is 
relatively widespread. However, the relationship between victims 
and society, as mediated by government policy, is underdeveloped; 
we address this gap in the literature. 
Two key questions to better understand cybercrime and eco- 
nomic espionage are: (1) what are the optimal levels of private 
and public investment in detection and prevention of theft (cyber 
security)?, and (2) what is the optimal level of investment in de- 
terrence via the expected punishment (detection and punishment 
levels)? Becker (1968) frames the social loss from crime as a func- 
tion of damages, costs of apprehension and conviction, the social 
cost of punishment, and the number of offenses. Our focus allows 
us to analyze FBI strategy to reduce the social loss of cybercrime 
by encouraging private investment in protection (cyber security). 
The expectation is private investment is eﬃcient both in terms of 
reducing the supply of offenses and damages, and a more eﬃcient 
balance of public versus private expenditures. 
3.1. Applying Becker 
To structure our analyses, we develop Becker’s analysis of ap- 
prehension and conviction (public expenditures), and protection 
and apprehension (private expenditures). We take as given the re- 
maining three elements of Becker’s model: damages, supplies of 
offenses, and punishments, in order to focus on public policy as- 
pects related to cybersecurity. This focus necessarily reduces the 
role of the criminal in our framework, by assuming a ﬁxed sup- 
ply of crime. Becker models this supply on the would-be crimi- 
nal’s expected utility (EU) of the crime, which weighs expected in- 
come against the expected punishment of the crime. The severity 
of punishment is less important than the probability of conviction. 
We implicitly include Becker’s supply of crime by addressing the 
latter, as inﬂuenced by the interaction between the ﬁrm and the 
FBI. 
Our conceptual framework examines private and public expen- 
ditures. Becker notes that the cost ( C ) to ‘apprehend and convict’ 
criminals is a function of activity ( A ) and increasing in A. A, the to- 
tal activity of apprehending and convicting offenders, is inversely 
related to the level of crime; as A rises, the level of crime de- 
creases. A itself is a function of manpower ( m ), resources ( r ) and 
capital ( c ). These relationships are summarized in Eq. (1) . 
The cost of apprehension and conviction 
C = f ( A ) 
Where A = f ( m, r, c ) 
C ′ = dC 
dA 
> 0 (1) 
However, the beneﬁts or reduced losses of less crime are offset 
against the costs ( C ) of this activity. As per Eq. (2 ), C can also be 
expressed as the sum of public expenditures ( C public ) and private 
expenditures ( C private ), where C private in our case is the sum of ex- 
penditures of all n ﬁrms in the economy ( C ﬁrm ). The relationship 
of these expenditures, in the context of Becker’s model, describes 
the delicate ecosystem in which the overall objective is an eﬃcient 
level of social loss that balances costs and beneﬁts. 
Breakdown of costs 
C = C public + C pri v ate 
C pri v ate = 
n ∑ 
i =1 
C f ir m i (2) 
The challenge for the FBI is that it must gauge the correct C public 
in order to achieve this eﬃcient outcome. Yet without knowledge 
of the level of theft, the government is unable to both judge ex 
ante C public and ex post pursue theft, leading to an ineﬃcient level 
of punishment and deterrence. However, as Becker (1968) notes, 
echoed by Png et al. (2006) , private expenditures (such as by the 
individual in our case C ﬁrm ) are negatively related to both C public 
and C private (the set of expenditures by other ﬁrms). For example, 
a ﬁrm may seek to shift their own costs to C public by relying on 
the judicial system even when private options may be more appro- 
priate ( Wagner, 2011 ). Equally, in our cybercrime environment, the 
ﬁrm may freeride on the herd immunity created by other ﬁrms, 
C private . This misalignment between the incentives of the individual 
ﬁrm, C, and social loss again supports the FBI’s policy to encour- 
age private investment in cyber security, C private . These competing 
preferences and relationships are visualized in Fig. 2 . 
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Fig. 2. Visualization of competing preferences in determining C. 
This framework is riddled with asymmetries of information. Our 
interest is the asymmetries between the decision makers setting 
the level of public and private expenditures ( C ), in reference to 
the activity of the FBI and the cybercrime victim ﬁrm. Becker also 
notes that total activity A can be approximated by the number of 
convictions, as displayed in Eq. (3) . This estimation multiplies p 
the ratio of offenses cleared by convictions to all convictions, and 
the activity level of offenses O . The challenge for the FBI, however, 
is that without reporting by ﬁrms, information asymmetries mean 
they have limited information on O , and therefore are ill equipped 
to estimate p . 
Approximating activity 
A ∼= pO (3) 
To investigate these relationships, we concentrate on the fallout 
of a cybercrime in the theft of trade secrets. We examine the fo- 
cused interactions of two players (the FBI and a victim ﬁrm) fol- 
lowing a case of cybercrime. In this case, the ﬁrm must decide 
whether or not to report the crime, and the FBI must decide how 
to allocate their resources. This targeted examination gives us in- 
sight into the wider challenges of setting the eﬃcient levels of ac- 
tivity. It necessarily looks at the focused interactions of two play- 
ers, in one instance, as part of the wider game, so that we can 
develop a conceptual framework. 
3.2. Game theoretic model 
Using Becker to motivate our game-theoretic signaling frame- 
work, we develop the game is represented in Fig. 3 . The sender is 
a ﬁrm. This ﬁrm can be of two types with respect to their cyber 
security investment ( C ﬁrm ): Type H (t H ) has a high security cyber 
environment and Type L (t L ) has a low security cyber environment. 
Nature chooses the type, where the likelihood of a high security 
ﬁrm is P(H) = α. Either type of ﬁrm can report (R) an exogenous 
breach (i.e. the theft of a trade secret) of their cyber security en- 
vironment. They may also choose to not report (NR) a breach. The 
ﬁrm’s message space is therefore m = (R, NR). This report signal 
is received by some government security agency (the FBI). This 
agency does not know whether the report is from a H or L type 
ﬁrm. However, the agency must decide to place a high or low pri- 
ority on the report, in the interest of maintaining an eﬃcient level 
of C public . The agency has a Bayesian belief about the likelihood 
of receiving a report from a high security ﬁrm, which drives the 
agency’s likelihood of placing a high priority on following up on a 
report. If the government agency believes a report comes from a 
high security type ﬁrm, then it will place a high priority (HP) on 
the report. On the other hand, if it believes that the report em- 
anates from a low security ﬁrm it will place a low priority (LP) on 
investigating the report. The agency cannot take any action (NA) in 
the absence of a report. The government security agency’s action 
space is therefore a = (HP, LP, NA). 9 
The players have preference ordering over their actions. The 
ﬁrm’s utility function U iF = U a jF,m ( B jF , C public , C f ir m i , r 
∑ n 
i =1 C f ir m i ) 
where j = (H, L) and P(H) = α; a = ( HP , LP , NA ) , and B jF is the 
beneﬁt to the individual ﬁrm from investing in security. Note that 
the individual ﬁrm’s utility depends not only on its’ own invest- 
ment in cybersecurity but also the overall private investment in 
cybersecurity. In other words, there are positive externalities from 
this private investment that increases B jF . 







( B S , C public , C pri v ate ) where j, m, and a are deﬁned above. 
B S is the social beneﬁt from the government agency’s actions. 
C public , C private are deﬁned above. The usual assumptions of ratio- 
nality apply to these utility functions. This is required of the se- 
quential rationality needed to use Bayesian Nash as an equilibrium 
reﬁnement as well as use expected utility as a part of a Nash solu- 
tion concept (see e.g. McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007 , pp. 20–22 and 
pp. 210–212). 
Above we have developed a pared back model to lay out the 
information structure that we seek to investigate. In what fol- 
lows, we apply this model to a speciﬁc and stylized example to 
illustrate how this model can be applied to the asymmetric in- 
formation problem we highlight. We model two circumstances for 
comparative analysis. In one case, the breach goes public whether 
the ﬁrm reports it (R) or not (NR). In the other case, the breach 
only goes public if the ﬁrm reports it and not if it does not. This 
allows us to use our model to analyze whether publicity about 
breaches inﬂuences a ﬁrm’s tendency to report breaches and the 
security agency’s desire to investigate breaches, and implications 
for C public , C private . 
A different analysis could be performed with a different ques- 
tion in mind by changing the preference ordering of the players. As 
it is, the structure of the game lends itself to solutions using sub- 
game perfection as well as Bayesian Nash. Further research using 
open source software like GAMBIT could be used to derive many 
different equilibria arising out of other preference orderings that 
reﬂect other lines of inquiry. Alternatively, such an approach could 
9 In this paper, our focus is on creating a framework for understanding infor- 
mation asymmetries between the government security agency and the ﬁrm as it 
relates to public and private investment in cybersecurity. We therefore keep the 
choice of security level exogenous and binary. We recognize that this decision itself 
is endogenous to the likelihood of a cyber-attack which in turn depends on ﬁrm 
and security agency investment, among other things. However, this circular chain 
of causality is diﬃcult to model. Moreover, the strategic interaction between the 
cybercriminal, the ﬁrm, and the security agency can be cast as a different problem. 
Basuchoudhary et al. (2015) focus on this latter problem by modeling ﬁrm security 
investment as a passive defense by ﬁrms, and government security agency action 
as an active defense involving detecting and punishing cyber criminals. 
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Fig. 3. The signaling game. 
Table 1 
Action, belief, and payoff tables for government security agency (Player 2). 
Player 2 Action Belief Utility 
Government security agency Hi-priority conditioned on reporting Report originates from high security ﬁrm U H P,H R 
S 
Government aecurity agency Low-priority conditioned on reporting Report originates from high security ﬁrm U LP,HR 
S 
Government security agency Hi-priority conditioned on reporting Report originates from low security ﬁrm U HP,LR 
S 
Government security agency Low-priority conditioned on reporting Report originates from low security ﬁrm U LP,LR 
S 
Government security agency No Action Low security ﬁrms do not report U NA,LR 
S 
Government security agency No Action Low security ﬁrms do not report U NA,HR 
S 
also determine the sensitivity of equilibria to plausible assump- 
tions about preferences ( Searle and Basuchoudhary, 2019 ). Thus, 
our model is ﬂexible for different analyses. In this paper we focus 
entirely on one such example; whether public knowledge about a 
breach matters or not by noting equilibrium changes in two situa- 
tions, ﬁrst where any breach becomes public knowledge and then 
when only reported breaches become public knowledge. 
4. Example: reporting cybercrimes and public and private 
resource allocation to security – does publicity matter? 
Above, we combined existing strands in the cybercrime litera- 
ture to highlight a theoretical gap in our understanding of cyber 
security breaches and trade secrets. Speciﬁcally, how does a secu- 
rity agency’s decisions to investigate a theft of trade secrets in- 
teract with a ﬁrm’s decision to report the crime and its decision 
to invest in security? In this section we apply the model devel- 
oped in the previous section to answer this question within a styl- 
ized example where we compare two scenarios. In one scenario all 
breaches go public; in the other only reported breaches go public. 
The action, belief, and payoff structures of the two players in our 
model are presented in Tables 1 and 2 . The preferences in these 
payoff structures is an example of how certain real-world features 
can be incorporated in our model (and not others). The rationale 
behind these assumptions are laid out in Appendix 1 . 
As noted above our example has two cases – one where a se- 
curity breach goes public irrespective of whether a ﬁrm reports it 
to the security agency or not and another where the breach is only 
made public if the ﬁrm reports the breach. We analyze each case 
below by deriving Nash equilibria. Each case informs equilibrium 
outcomes, which we represent as Hypotheses. The Hypotheses in 
Table 2 
Action and payoff tables for ﬁrms (Player 1). 
Player 1 Player 1 Action Player 2 Action Utility 
High-security investment Report High-Priority U HP HF,R 
High-security investment Report Low-Priority U LP HF,R 
High-security investment Does not report No action U NA HF,NR 
Low-security investment Report High-Priority U HP LF,R 
Low-security investment Report Low-Priority U LP LF,R 
Low-security investment Does not report No action U NA LF,NR 
turn may have dynamic consequences, which are not necessarily 
in equilibrium, which we present as implications. 
Case 1 . The security breach goes public . 
In this case, a security breach goes public irrespective of 
whether a ﬁrm reports it or not. Here, the security agencies prefer- 
ence ordering is are U H P,H R 
S 
> U LP,HR 
S 
> U N A,LN R 
S 
> U N A,HN R 
S 
> U LP,LR 
S 
> U HP,LR 
S 
while the ﬁrms’ are U HP HF, R > U 
LP 
HF, R > U 
HP 
LF, R > U 
LP 
LF, R > 
U NA 
HF, NR 
> U NA 
LF, NR 
. The rationale behind such a preference ordering 
is explained in Appendix 1 . We derive the pooling equilibrium that 
arises in this case, where all ﬁrms report a breach and the govern- 
ment security agency always places a high priority on a report if 
α is greater than a certain non-zero threshold, in Appendix 2 . This 
equilibrium is restated in Hypothesis 1 . 
Hypothesis 1. If security breaches go public, security agencies will 
place a high priority for investigating a breach iff α is larger than 
a certain threshold denoted α∗. 
Notice that Hypothesis 1 drives a government agency’s cost al- 
location decisions. Beliefs about the likelihood a ﬁrm will adopt 
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high security at some cost C f ir m i drive C public. The government 
therefore should have a stake in promoting private investment in 
security to protect trade secrets. 10 This is in line with the 2018 
National Cyber Strategy of the United States and the 2013 Admin- 
istration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets. 
Hypothesis 1 has dynamic effects. The fact that all breaches go 
public counterintuitively creates a space (if α is below the thresh- 
old deﬁned in (3) ) where the security agency is unlikely to place a 
high priority on any report regardless of the security level breach. 
One possible dynamic effect of such a situation could disincen- 
tivize ﬁrms from choosing high security in the ﬁrst place and fur- 
ther depressing α. 11 Akin to Lagazio et al (2014) , this could create a 
vicious cycle where ﬁrms do not choose high security at all – after 
all, why bother if the security agency is unlikely to pay attention 
and do something about it. To be speciﬁc, notice that the thresh- 
old value α∗ rises as the payoff U LP,HR 
S 
rises. In short, as the cost of 
missing out on winnable cases falls, ceteris paribus , the government 
agency is places high priority on cases for a smaller, and there- 
fore realistically less likely, range of α. For example say at ﬁrst the 
threshold value of α is 0.2. Then as U LP,HR 
S 
rises say this threshold 
value rises to 0.7. Now a higher proportion of H ﬁrms are neces- 
sary to initiate a high priority response by the government agency. 
Thus, a rising U LP,HR 
S 
may lead to fewer high priority responses by 
the government agency. In a dynamic setting, this disincentivizes a 
ﬁrm to invest in higher security. This leads to Implication 1.1 . 
Implication 1.1. If a security agency has lower costs from assign- 
ing low priority to a high security ﬁrm, ﬁrms avoid investments in 
high security when all breaches go public. 
Indeed, to better allocate resources, a policy response may be 
to force ﬁrms to reveal their security investment on pain of pun- 
ishment given the incentive structure where all security breaches 
ultimately go public. Currently, the FBI reporting process requires 
disclosure on protection measures; an insuﬃciently protected trade 
secret is not a trade secret. Our model likewise suggests the se- 
curity agency’s ability to allocate resources is critical for public 
safety. If more ﬁrms are not incentivized to invest in higher se- 
curity ( C ﬁrm ) the FBI may choose to place a low priority on cyber- 
crime generally. This would embolden criminals and place a pall 
on economic activity. This leads to Implication 1.2 . 
Implication 1.2. Firms should bear a greater share of the respon- 
sibility of protecting themselves than a government agency when 
breaches go public. 
Case 2 . The security breach does not go public if unreported . 
We have assumed the security agency is indifferent to whether 
a breach goes public or not, focused as they are on catching 
criminals rather than controlling the media. Thus, the security 
agency’s preference ordering remains the same as in case 1. How- 
ever, the ﬁrms payoff preference ordering in this case, as described 
in Appendix 1 , is U HP 
HF, R 
> U NA 
HF, NR 
> U LP 
HF, R 
> U NA 
LF, NR 
> U HP 
LF, R 
> 
U LP LF, R . This preference ordering leads to a separating equilibrium 
derived in Appendix 3 . In this equilibrium, only high security ﬁrms 
report a breach and the security agency always places a high pri- 
ority on any report. This is restated in Hypothesis 2 . 
Hypothesis 2. Low security ﬁrms never report a breach while high 
security ﬁrms always report a breach if breaches can be kept se- 
cret. In this case, the government agency always assigns high pri- 
ority to any reported breaches. 
10 Nevertheless, we recognize that whether self-interested individuals in govern- 
ment have an incentive to promote private high security or not is an interesting 
exercise in political economy in its own right. 
11 We do not model this endogeneity here, but it seems like a plausible inference. 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the ability to keep breaches secret 
may actually lead to more eﬃcient resource utilization for the 
government agency. Low security ﬁrms have an incentive to keep 
breaches secret. But this dynamic would encourage hackers to tar- 
get low security ﬁrms. Which would create a private incentive for 
low security ﬁrms to adopt high security as well. This leads to 
Implication 2.1 . 
Implication 2.1. As long as unreported breaches are secret, ﬁrms 
have an incentive to adopt high security. 
Hypothesis 1 and its implications suggest ﬁrms may underin- 
vest in high security when breaches go public. Whether they do 
depends on the proportion of ﬁrms that choose high security and 
consequently the likelihood a security agency will place high prior- 
ity on a security breach at a high security ﬁrm. Firms avoiding the 
high cost of public scrutiny if they chose not to report a breach 
drive this dynamic. 
Hypothesis 2 on the other hand suggests that if ﬁrms can keep 
breaches private by not reporting, then only high security ﬁrms 
will report a breach. This makes it easy for the security agency to 
give a high priority to all reported reaches. The security agency 
prefers this latter scenario because it directs resources toward 
breaches that can be resolved positively. In turn, such directed re- 
sources would increase the likelihood that low security ﬁrms adopt 
high security. Hypothesis 2 and its implications therefore create a 
positive incentive for ﬁrms to adopt high security. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 show that a ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in 
high security is contextual and leads us to Hypothesis 3 . 
Hypothesis 3. A ﬁrm is more likely to invest in high security when 
security breaches can be kept private. 
We present two cases in the section below. We note however 
that while in principle all our Hypotheses are testable, in prac- 
tice some of the information may not be available to the impar- 
tial observer. We focus on Hypothesis 1 to reveal this possibility in 
the cases below. We reiterate that the game theoretic methodology 
reveals mathematically logical implications for ﬁrms and security 
agencies from certain contexts, for example, going public or not. 
These implications, being mathematical, are precise and therefore 
more precisely falsiﬁable. Thus our game theoretic framework may 
be a helpful tool to explicitly bring science into the debate over 
cyber security/trade secret policy. 
4.1. Case studies 
Applying our framework to the real world, this section exam- 
ines two court cases prosecuted under the U.S. Economic Espi- 
onage Act. Both cases are examples of industrial espionage where 
defendants are alleged to have bypassed cyber security controls 
and accessed their former employer’s trade secrets. We address 
Hypothesis 1 and its corollaries as it assumes breaches become 
public and is therefore observable. As Hypothesis 1 argues, when 
all security breaches go public, the FBI places high priority on all 
reported cases if the proportion of high security ﬁrms reaches a 
threshold. 
Our ﬁrst case study, in the ﬁnancial sector, demonstrates the in- 
terplay between a bank and the FBI. Sergey Aleynikov ( US v. Sergey 
Aleynikov, 2010 ) was employed by the investment bank Goldman 
Sachs as a computer programmer for their high-frequency trading 
platform. In 2009, Aleynikov left to work for a competitor expand- 
ing into high-frequency trading, and was subsequently accused of 
stealing Goldman coding. The FBI and the federal US court sys- 
tem devoted extensive resources to prosecuting Aleynikov in court 
proceedings that eventually failed. The federal case had a number 
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of twists, as the original prosecution was overturned on technical 
points. 12 A later New York state case convicted Aleynikov in 2018. 
Breaches in the ﬁnancial sector may be more likely, globally, to 
become public. The sector is highly regulated and has more obli- 
gations related to data breaches than other sectors. 13 These reg- 
ulations shift more responsibility onto the ﬁrm (Implication 1.2) 
and mean that a ﬁrm suffering a breach can be legally required to 
make the breach public. Thus, we can conclude that our assump- 
tion that breaches go public (or are at least more likely to go pub- 
lic) can be applied. 
In the case above, Goldman Sachs reported (R) the theft in 
July 2009. The time from Goldman Sachs reporting to the FBI 
and Aleynikov’s arrest was two days. The speed at which Gold- 
man Sachs pursued action suggests they expected the loss of the 
trade secret to have an immediate impact on the business, and 
the breach likely to become public. Goldman Sachs, a large bank 
with extensive political ties, convinced the FBI to pursue HP. As 
Wagner (2011) argues, “[victims with] strong existing ties to the 
federal government…could determine if the relevant wrongdoers 
will be criminally pursued.”14 Under R and HP, Goldman Sachs’s 
payoffs were either U HP HF, R or U 
HP 
LF, R . Both U 
HP 
HF, R and U 
HP 
LF, R are 
greater than non-reported (NR) outcomes in the event the theft 
goes public. However, given HP, only U HP 
HF, R 
is greater than NR out- 
comes when the theft does not go public, as U NA LF, NR > U 
HP 
LF, R . From 
the choice to report (R), we can infer that Goldman Sachs self- 
assessed as H, although the discussion below questions this. 
As per the second part of our Hypothesis 1 , the FBI adopted 
HP. Court documents 15 describe the urgency with which the gov- 
ernment pursued action, based on the assumption that the code 
could swiftly be used to create a functioning trading platform. The 
extensive government action following the FBI investigation also 
supports the argument that the case was treated as a priority. Re- 
turning to Hypothesis 1 , the FBI may globally assume that α in 
the ﬁnancial sector, a relatively security-conscious sector, meets 
the threshold α∗. Consequently, the FBI likely assessed Goldman as 
H and assigned HP. Court documents also describe the government 
as relying heavily on Goldman Sachs’s self-report in a manner that, 
according to the defendant’s lawyers, was atypical. 16 This suggests 
that the FBI had limited information as to whether Goldman Sachs 
was L or H. 
Goldman Sachs may not, however, have been Lewis (2013) calls 
Goldman Sachs’s security into question and discusses arguments 
that much of the stolen code was open source. Goldman Sachs’s 
response to Lewis (2013, p.1) argues instead that, “the ﬁrm has put 
in place extensive safeguards to protect this valuable technology.”
However, the status of Goldman Sachs as either H and L in prac- 
tice may be moot, the allocation of HP suggests the FBI assessed 
Goldman’s cyber security as H. 
The outcome of the Goldman Sachs case is an instance where 
the FBI chose HP, but it is unknown whether Goldman Sachs was 
H or L. The FBI’s choice of HP also likely considered wider issues 
such as the reputation of the NY Financial Sector. Indeed, the pros- 
ecutor in the New York state case argued, “no company wants to 
12 This ﬁnding was on the grounds that the source code was not physical property 
and further that the code did not meet the economic espionage requirement as no 
foreign commerce came into play. 
13 For example, the Financial Modernization Act of 1999 which makes banks liable 
for data breaches and ﬁnes associated with Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard. 
14 p. 1032 
15 Doc 35 “Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendant’s Motion For Court Ap- 
proval, Nunc Pro Tunc, To Subpoena Documents And Materials From Goldman Sachs 
& Company” in (2010) 3:16 −cr −00198 −AWT −1, USDC SDNY. 
16 Doc 35 “Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendant’s Motion For Court Ap- 
proval, Nunc Pro Tunc, To Subpoena Documents And Materials From Goldman Sachs 
& Company” cited in (2010) 3:16 −cr −00198 −AWT −1, USDC SDNY. 
do business in a market where someone can steal its work prod- 
uct without implications" ( Stempel, 2017 , p. 1). Nonetheless, the 
FBI investigation resulted in the FBI’s worst payoff ( U HP,LR 
S 
) – be- 
cause although the FBI chose to assess the case based on HP, the 
case was unsuccessful in terms of securing a conviction. 
Goldman Sachs fared slightly better, as it eventually reached 
U HP 
LF, R 
(its third best payoff in a scenario where a case goes public) 
given the lack of conviction and assuming L. However, the success 
in the NY v. Aleynikov state case means Goldman Sachs effectively 
ended at U HP 
HF, R 
, its highest payoff. (The same is not true for the 
FBI as it only deals with federal cases.) This case also demonstrates 
that Goldman Sachs successfully leveraged Becker’s C public to aug- 
ment, or even offset, the ﬁrm’s investment in security ( C ﬁrm ). In 
both scenarios, Goldman Sachs successfully in leveraged C public to 
its beneﬁt. 
Our second case provides further insights into Hypothesis 1 . 
The two defendants, Jared Sparks and Jay Williams ( USA v. Sparks 
et al. 2016 ), worked for LBI Inc., a contractor for the US Of- 
ﬁce of Naval Research (ONR) (part of the Department of Defense 
(DOD)), from 2010 to 2011 designing unmanned vehicles. Sparks 
and Williams left LBI to join another ONR contractor, Charles Rivers 
Analytics (CRA), a larger competitor expanding into unmanned ve- 
hicles. Before leaving LBI, the defendants transmitted LBI docu- 
ments to CRA. LBI lost $2.7M 17 in contracts as a direct result of the 
trade secret theft. In 2018, Sparks was found guilty while charges 
against Williams were dismissed. 
Like the ﬁnancial sector, the defense sector is highly regulated. 
Cyber security requirements for DOD contractors are rigorous. 18 
DOD contractors are required to report suspicious activity; ten per- 
cent of contractors ﬁle a report in a given year. 19 It is reasonable 
to assume that breaches in the defense sector typically become, at 
least in part, public (some may be restricted due to security con- 
cerns.) Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the proportion 
of ﬁrms with high security ( α) is relatively high. 
At the time of the theft in 2011, however, DOD cyber secu- 
rity requirements were inconsistent, 20 and the FBI would not have 
been able to take it as given, a priori , that LBI was H. However, the 
FBI may have expected LBI to be more likely H than L ( α > 0.50). 
Court documents refer to LBI as having, “reasonable measures to 
protect and keep secret its proprietary information as well as to 
protect the integrity of its physical equipment and electronic ﬁles”
(Indictment, p. 6) . 21 Yet the relatively unsophisticated manner of 
the document transmission (using the cloud storage service Drop- 
Box), suggests that while the protection may have been reasonable, 
it was not particularly effective. 
LBI was obliged to report (R). The loss of both the $2.7 M 
contract and the competitive advantage of the innovations docu- 
mented in the stolen prototypes and drawings negatively affected 
LBI, a relatively small ﬁrm. This compounds its disadvantage when 
competing with the larger CRA in government tenders and makes 
it even more resource-limited in pursuing civil redress. Pursuing 
criminal redress may abate these negative impacts and address 
reputational concerns as signaling H demonstrates LBI’s trustwor- 
thiness as a contractor. 
The outcome is mixed as the defendants received different out- 
comes from their jury trials. Williams was charged but then ac- 
17 Case 3:16-cr-00198-AWT Document 388-7 Filed 08/20/18. 
18 E.g. The 2016 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sets out minimum security 
standards and introduces a 72-hour reporting window for cyber security incidents. 
19 Oﬃce of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX). (2011) Foreign 
Spies stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, Accessed October 18, 2018 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=720057 . 
20 Cyber security standards for Department of Defense contractors were inconsis- 
tent and largely addressed in individual contracts and guidelines until the adoption 
of new standards in 2013. 
21 Case 3:16-cr-00198-AWT Document 1 Filed 11/03/16. 
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quitted of seven counts; Sparks was charged with 21 counts and 
found guilty on 13. On balance, it appears that case was H and 
HP, resulting in [ U HP 
HF, R 
, U H P,H R 
S 
] as the outcome. Coupled with the 
expectation that these cases go public, this again supports our 
Hypothesis 1 . The FBI’s decision to investigate the alleged theft 
may have also been inﬂuenced by the fact that LBI works in a po- 
litical sensitive area – defense. The FBI may have afforded HP to 
the case both as a combination of their assessment of α and the 
nationally strategic nature of the case. 
According to an FBI press release at the conclusion of the case, 
“Preventing intellectual property theft is a priority of the FBI’s 
criminal investigative program. The key to this successful prosecu- 
tion was due to linking considerable resources and collaboration of 
the private sector, federal law enforcement partners, the U.S. Attor- 
ney’s oﬃce and the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intel- 
lectual Property Section” (DOJ, 2018, p1) . In Beckerian terms, this 
case demonstrates how C public can be important for smaller ﬁrms 
like LBI; these ﬁrms may not have the resources to pursue civil lit- 
igation of the theft of their business secrets. This also provides a 
nuance to implication 1.2 in that the size of the victim ﬁrm may 
inﬂuence how much responsibility it should bear in protecting se- 
crets. 
4.2. Policy implications 
In the ﬁght to reduce the level and impact of espionage and 
trade secret theft via cybercrime, the FBI encourages improved se- 
curity at the ﬁrm level, with C private offsetting C public . Our case stud- 
ies support Hypothesis 1 – where breaches go public, and the FBI 
has assessed victim ﬁrms as meeting a H threshold ( α∗), and there- 
fore place HP on reports. A high security ﬁrm is in a good posi- 
tion even if they are in Case 2, where breaches do not go pub- 
lic, as they still report and still receive high priority from the FBI 
( Hypothesis 2 ). Paradoxically, Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest a ﬁrm 
is more likely to invest in high security if the breaches can remain 
secret ( Hypothesis 3 .) Thus, regulations requiring the reporting of 
theft, data breaches and ﬁnancial details to encourage disclosure, 
thereby creating an environment where breaches become public, 
may decrease private incentives to invest in security. This section 
discusses potential policy measures. 
Government agencies seek the disclosure of cyber breaches to 
inform evidence based-policy making (better estimate p and O ) 
and assist with allocation of resources. These agencies also seek to 
increase C private relative to C public . These goals are at cross-purposes 
as Hypothesis 3 suggests ﬁrm is more likely to invest in high se- 
curity when security breaches can be kept private. For example, 
as per Fig. 4: The underinvestment and disclosure loop, a policy 
that increases the number of reports makes it more diﬃcult for 
the agency to distinguish between L and H. Thus, in this scenario 
the agency assigns more cases LP. This would result in more failed 
prosecutions, reducing the incentives to invest, and therefore tak- 
ing α below the threshold α∗. Ultimately, the agency pursues less 
cases resulting in more breaches over time. To break this cycle, we 
argue that reporting ﬁrms should be forced to reveal their type (H 
or L). If unreported breaches remain secret, ﬁrms have an in-built 
incentive, without a policy intervention, to adopt H. This implies 
policy interventions to force disclosure could undermine a private 
incentive to invest. 
If governments choose to prioritize the reporting of crime, a po- 
tential policy measure to increase disclosure could be a mandatory 
criminal reporting law. Orozco (2012) proposes such mandatory re- 
porting of suspected trade secret theft, 22 and argues it would en- 
22 The authors limit this to outbound trade secret theft, where the trade secret is 
taken from the ﬁrm. This is opposed to inbound theft, when a stolen trade secret is 
brought into the ﬁrm. 
Fig. 4. The underinvestment and disclosure loop: the implications of forced disclo- 
sure. 
courage better data security. However, the introduction of a re- 
quirement to report could discourage the use of trade secrets in 
the ﬁrst place, in addition to avoiding the creation of negative ex- 
ternalities such as limiting civil liberties. 
Existing ﬁnancial reporting regulations, such as the reporting 
requirements of listed companies, could be a policy lever to both 
encourage disclosure and encourage security investment. The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) annual 10-K form for 
ﬁling ﬁrms includes a section on speculation and risk, where cy- 
ber security breaches can be reported. Hilary et al. (2016) ﬁnd 
that the use of this section has increased modestly over the pe- 
riod 2010–15. While our model does not involve making C ﬁrm pub- 
lic, security spending could become part of standard reporting re- 
quirements providing an incentive for a ﬁrm to spend appropri- 
ately. Where ﬁrms have chosen to include valuations of IP on their 
balance sheets, the loss of secrecy through theft requires an adjust- 
ment to the balance sheet. Insurers may also play a role in report- 
ing requirements, as policies can require disclosure to the insurer 
when secrecy is affected. 
Further possibilities exist under data protection laws. Existing 
privacy protection laws address personal data, which can fall un- 
der trade secrecy. In the event of a cyber security breach result- 
ing in the theft of such data, ﬁrms could be obligated to disclose 
the theft. The ﬁnance and defense sectors are already subjected to 
such regulations. Existing disclosure policies in data breaches are 
estimated to reduce identity theft by six percent ( Romanosky et al., 
2011 ) and increase investment in cyber security ( Burstein and Mul- 
ligan, 2007 ). Yet Hilary et al. (2016) ﬁnd that US policies to encour- 
age disclosure have led to only a modest increase in disclosures. 
However, disclosure regulations increase costs to business. Thus, 
in addition to creating an environment matching Hypothesis 3 , in- 
creased regulations may perversely reduce the ability of a ﬁrm to 
devote resources to cyber security. 
An existing policy measure for addressing investment in secu- 
rity is that the courts redeﬁne “reasonable protection” with respect 
to cyber security in order to qualify for trade secrecy. If the bar 
is set higher than current levels of protection, then ﬁrms will be 
incentivized to invest in cyber security in order to protect their 
trade secrets. This could achieve the FBI’s goal to encourage invest- 
ment and reduce theft, without impacting reporting and potential 
strains on FBI resource. However, this approach could go both ways 
– courts may either raise or lower the security bar, as decisions 
are based on individual cases and not government policy. Follow- 
ing trends in litigation, lawyers are advising clients to adopt the 
US National Institute of Standards and Technology frameworks as 
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a standard ( Shackelford, 2016 ). Yet standards quickly become obso- 
lete and it may be necessary for legislation to clarify ‘reasonable’ 
( Cash, 2015 ). Furthermore, the court need not consider the wider 
‘herd-immunization’ implications, which could result in the bar be- 
ing set below the socially eﬃcient level. 
5. Conclusion 
Our analysis brings together existing strands in the cybercrime 
literature to present a theoretical gap in our understanding of de- 
cision making in trade secrets protection. That is, asymmetric in- 
formation problems between ﬁrms and government agencies inﬂu- 
ence public and private investments in cybersecurity. We attempt 
to ﬁll this gap with a signaling game where preferences of the ﬁrm 
and the government agency are determined in the Becker crime 
and punishment framework. We then apply this model in a spe- 
ciﬁc example where we analyze the incentives for investment de- 
cisions in two scenarios; one where all security breaches go pub- 
lic and another where only reported breaches go public. We then 
show how some results of this application are plausible in real- 
istic settings and discuss policy implications. We suggest that, to 
the extent our model captures a fundamental asymmetric informa- 
tion problem between victims of a security breach and government 
agencies, it can be used to analyze other problems as well. 
In pursuing our illustration, we ﬁnd that when unreported 
breaches inevitably become public, the security agency might 
never choose to place a high priority on any report. This scenario 
may generate a vicious cycle where an increasing number of ﬁrms 
choose to go with low security, given that the security agency does 
not investigate cyber-attacks because it believes that reports are 
more likely to come from low security ﬁrms. This effect is elimi- 
nated if not reporting a security breach guarantees the privacy of 
the ﬁrm. In this case, a ﬁrm that chooses to invest less in secu- 
rity will never report a security breach, while a ﬁrm with high 
security investment will always report a breach. In the separating 
equilibrium that follows, the security agency places a high prior- 
ity on all reports because it believes them to be from high secu- 
rity ﬁrms. This separating equilibrium may then jumpstart a virtu- 
ous selection process encouraging more ﬁrms to adopt higher se- 
curity. Thus, publicity may paradoxically enhance the likelihood of 
adverse selection and worsen the security environment in for trade 
secrets in cyber space. 
Our model presents a number of extensions and possibilities 
for future research. In particular, we have assumed that the ﬁrm 
knows ex ante whether their theft will go public; removal of this 
assumption could introduce scenarios where the negative publicity 
from not reporting a theft could shift the ﬁrm’s preferences. Ad- 
ditionally, incorporation of the policy measures we have suggested 
could manipulate outcomes in favor of FBI preferences. We have 
necessarily focused on a single-ﬁrm case, however a more macro 
approach could provide insights into welfare impacts, ﬁrm interac- 
tions and international implications. There is also room for empir- 
ical exploration of our theory; differences between jurisdictional 
approaches to data breaches and trade secret theft may serve as 
natural experiments to test our policy conclusions. Our methodol- 
ogy reveals several testable hypotheses with implications for how 
policy may inﬂuence (sometimes unhelpfully) ﬁrm investments in 
cyber security. Further empirical understanding of ﬁrms’ cyber se- 
curity investment decisions may therefore provide nuance. 
While we have focused on the FBI’s goal of increasing private 
investment cyber security ( C private ), Becker also notes that the ex- 
pected utility of crime ( EU ), which is a function of the probability 
of prosecution ( p ), punishment ( f ), and the income from the crime 
( Y ), also inﬂuence the supply of crime. The FBI could choose direct 
action to reduce EU by increasing p through increasing C public or in- 
creasing f through government legislation. These Beckerian policy 
options merit further exploration and could provide insights into 
legal and policy trends and attempts to keep jurisprudence in line 
with technology. 
Finally, our analysis focuses on domestic policy. True ‘herd im- 
munity’ requires collective efforts to encourage security; there is 
‘no island in cyberspace’ ( Shackelford, 2016 ). We have limited un- 
derstanding of the global aspects of cybercrime and the appropri- 
ate political response. Framing the research question in an inter- 
national policy context, which ironically might involve developing 
standards with the state-sponsors of cybercrime, could yield inter- 
esting results. As cybercrime and trade secrets continue to be a 
growing concern for ﬁrms and governments, we expect to see in- 
creased research interest in this area. 
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Appendix 1. Assumption driving preferences 
The security agency’s payoffs in order of preference are 
U H P,H R 
S 
> U LP,HR 
S 
> U N A,LN R 
S 
> U N A,HN R 
S 
> U LP,LR 
S 
> U HP,LR 
S 
. The se- 
curity agency prefers to respond to H rather than L ﬁrms because 
the security agency wants to incentivize investment in high secu- 
rity by offering greater protection to such ﬁrms. The FBI and the 
wider judicial system have resource constraints forcing such deci- 
sions. 23 It therefore seems reasonable to seek to commit resources 
to ﬁrms with high security because (a) high security systems are 
more likely to lead to convictions because these systems are de- 
signed to better track breach processes, and/or (b) high security 
meets the reasonable protection threshold for trade secrecy protec- 
tion, whereas low security may not and thus frustrate prosecution. 
Furthermore, protecting ﬁrms that did the right things is fair and 
appears as such to the taxpayer. 
Given these parameters, the security agency prefers to place 
high priority on reports from a high security ﬁrms rather than a 
high priority on a low security ﬁrm ( U H P,H R 
S 
> U HP,LR 
S 
). In fact, as 
prosecutions in the face of low security are unsuccessful 24 ( U N A,HN R 
S 
and U N A,LN R 
S 
are preferred over U HP,LR 
S 
and U LP,LR 
S 
) security agen- 
cies would prefer to not receive any report at all to receiving re- 
ports from a low security ﬁrm. Nevertheless, it would rather not 
receive a report from a low security ﬁrm than a high security ﬁrm 
( U N A,LN R 
S 
> U N A,HN R 
S 
) as it has a general preference for H as a mat- 
ter of national cyber security and trade secret policy. In any case 
the agency would rather place a high priority rather than a low 
priority on reports it believes are coming from high security ﬁrms 
23 Senator Coons’ (Democrat-Delaware), comment (in Committe on the Judi- 
ciary, 2014 ) “The Department of Justice has many priorities and limited resources , 
and so it is unsurprising to me that there were just 25 trade secret cases brought 
last year” highlights this resource allocation problem. Likewise, “FBI cyber in- 
vestigators hate to admit they’re brutally overworked and must triage cases…”
( Selby, 2017 .p. 1). 
24 A higher security environment requires more extensive or sophisticated action 
on the part of the cybercriminal. Thus, proving mens rea (mental state of intent 
or recklessness in committing a crime) or similar is consequently easier in a high 
security environment. Furthermore, in order to qualify for trade secret protection, 
the knowledge in question must be subject to reasonable steps of protection; low 
security is assumed not to have met, ex post , this threshold. Anson et al. (2005) note 
that trade secrecy protection is often only determined when conﬂict has arisen. 
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( U H P,H R 
S 
> U LP,HR 
S 
) and vice versa if it believes reports are coming 
from low security ﬁrms ( U LP,LR 
S 
> U HP,LR 
S 
). The government agency 
ﬁnds it costly to mistakenly assign a low priority to a high secu- 
rity ﬁrm to incentivize ﬁrms to adopt a high security stance as a 
public good. Alternatively, placing a high priority on a low security 
ﬁrm wastes resources. The security agency’s incentive structure is 
therefore geared to minimize security breaches by incentivizing 
ﬁrms to adopt a high security stance and to promote the public 
good; for example, promoting innovation by keeping proprietary 
inventions from being copied. Thus, the security agency is not con- 
cerned about the private cost to ﬁrms from economic espionage. 
Notice that these a priori conditions are unrelated to whether the 
security breach goes public or not. Consequently, whether a breach 
goes public or not does not affect the preference ordering of the 
government security agency. 
Case 1: If a security breach goes public irrespective of whether 
a ﬁrm reports it or not, the ﬁrms payoff preference ordering is 
U HP 
HF, R 
> U LP 
HF, R 
> U HP 
LF, R 
> U LP 
LF, R 
> U NA 
HF, NR 
> U NA 
LF, NR 
. Breaches be- 
coming public could reﬂect future disclosure regulations, particu- 
larly for listed companies and government contractors. 25 Thus, a 
high security ﬁrm having done due diligence on security would 
rather have the security agency place a high priority on their re- 
port than a low priority and would rather report than not report 
( U HP 
HF, R 
> U LP 
HF, R 
> U NA 
HF, NR 
) since our model has no advantage from 
hiding the breach. In fact, the low security ﬁrm would also pre- 
fer reporting in order to avoid bad publicity and the liability cost 
of not reporting given the assumption the breach is bound to go 
public ( U HP 
LF, R 
and U LP 
LF, R 
are both > U NA 
LF, NR 
). We further assume 
U NA 
HF, NR 
> U NA 
LF, NR 
because even when the breach goes public, the 
high security ﬁrm can at least claim to have tried to deter crim- 
inals by securing their network, and therefore avoid the liability 
faced by low security ﬁrms that failed to even try. As there is no 
advantage to hiding a breach – all breaches go public – reporting 
is generally preferred to not reporting. That is, U HP 
HF, R 
, U LP 
HF, R 





are all preferred to U NA 
HF, NR 
, U NA 
LF, NR 
since unreported breaches 
impact company value by reducing customer and shareholder trust 
in company management. Reporting also conveys beneﬁts by pro- 
viding a means for criminal action in cases where civil redress is 
ineffective (e.g., judgment-proof defendants) and, in a dynamic set- 
ting, transparency and cooperation with the FBI may convey bene- 
ﬁts to the ﬁrm in the event of future breaches. 
Case 2: On the other hand, if the security breach does 
not go public then the ﬁrms payoff preference ordering is 
U HP 
HF, R 
> U NA 
HF, NR 




> U HP 
LF, R 
> U LP 
LF, R 
. The lack of 
publicity changes the low security ﬁrm’s payoffs and skews it to- 
ward not reporting at all since the liability from going public no 
longer exists. Thus, both U HP 
LF, R 
and U LP 
LF, R 
are less than U NA 
LF, NR 
. Nev- 
ertheless, if the low security ﬁrm did report it would prefer the 
security agency place a high priority on the report, i.e., U HP LF, R > 
U LP LF, R . This is a moot point, however, since the low security ﬁrm 
will never report under the circumstances. The high security ﬁrm 
though is faced with a conundrum. If it reports the breach to the 
security agency then, as always, the ﬁrm prefers a high priority by 
the security agency. The security agency’s use of high priority will 
result in conviction of the perpetrators and minimize the ability 
of competitors to use the innovation protected by the trade secret 
and may even result in victim compensation paid to the ﬁrm. 
However, the ﬁrm would rather not report if it believes the re- 
port will receive a low priority from the security agency. Recall re- 
porting leads to public revelation of the breach. A low priority by 
the security agency then would not only not result in a convic- 
tion but it would reveal that the breach happened and tarnish the 
25 To a certain extent, this is already true for military contractors as discussed in 
the case studies. 
ﬁrm’s reputation. All this implies that U HP 
HF, R 
> U NA 
HF, NR 
> U LP 
HF, R 
. We 
arbitrarily assume that U LP HF, R > U 
NA 
LF, NR to have a complete prefer- 
ence ordering. Alternatively, U NA 
LF, NR 
could be >U LP 
HF, R 
. Either way 
we would have a complete preference ordering over all outcomes 
and have no effect on the outcome of the game. Our assumption of 
breaches going public if reported is a matter of reality. Assuming 
investigation leads to charges, court records are typically public, so 
action by the security agency or remedy arising from this action 
would be public knowledge. 
Appendix 2. Establishing the Nash Equilibrium in Case 1 
We start with a pooling strategy proﬁle and then test for stabil- 
ity, to establish whether the chosen proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium. 
In this case, the high security ﬁrm prefers U HP 
HF, R 





. The low security ﬁrm also prefers U HP 
LF, R 
and U LP 
LF, R 
over 
U NA LF, NR . Both types of ﬁrms then will always report to the security 
agency. The security agency knows that in this pooling scenario it 
is likely to get a report from a high security (H) ﬁrm with α proba- 
bility. Thus, it gets a report from a low security (L) ﬁrm with prob- 
ability 1 - α. The security agency then calculates its expected pay- 
offs from placing a high priority and compares it to its expected 
payoffs from placing a low priority. It then chooses the strategy 
with the higher expected payoff. The expected payoffs are: 
E( HP ) = αU H P,H R 
S 




E( LP ) = αU LP,HR 
S 
+ (1 − α) U LP,HR 
S 
(B2) 
Thus, the security agency will only place a high priority on a 


















Notice that (B3) is certainly plausible since it re- 
quires that α be greater than some positive fraction. 26 
Thus, if α is greater than this threshold value, α∗ = 












) , then the 
security agency will always place a high priority on a report and 
a low priority otherwise. We have already established that both 
types of ﬁrms will always report a breach when all breaches go 
public. Neither player will deviate from this strategy proﬁle thus 
establishing a stable pooling Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Further 
notice that as U LP,HR 
S 
, rises so does α∗. 
Appendix 3. Establishing the Nash Equilibrium in Case 2 
In this case notice that the ﬁrm’s payoff structure suggests that 
the L type ﬁrm will never report a security breach. In compari- 
son, the H type ﬁrm will report a security breach if it believes the 
report will be accorded a high priority but not otherwise. This cre- 
ates a scenario where both types of ﬁrms may not pool (always re- 
port) on reporting a breach. This opens the possibility of a mixed 
strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. However, the solution is sim- 
pler. In this case, the fact the L ﬁrm will never report a breach 
means that all reports must be from the H ﬁrm even if some H 
ﬁrms choose not to report. Thus, from the security agency’s per- 
spective the likelihood that a reported breach is from a H type is 
1. Given this belief, it is optimal for the security agency to always 
place a high priority on any reported breach. Of course, in that case 
the H type ﬁrm should always report. In other words, in the sce- 
nario where not reporting a breach never becomes public, the H 
26 (3) is always a positive fraction since the denominator will always be larger 
than the numerator and positive given the rank ordering of the payoffs. 
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ﬁrm will always report, the L ﬁrm will never report, and the secu- 
rity agency will always place a high priority on a reported breach, 
establishing a stable separating equilibrium. 
CRediT authorship contribution statement 
Atin Basuchoudhary: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Inves- 
tigation, Methodology, Visualization, Writing - original draft, Writ- 
ing - review & editing. Nicola Searle: Conceptualization, Data cu- 
ration, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Method- 
ology, Project administration, Resources, Visualization, Writing - 
original draft, Writing - review & editing. 
References 
Acquisti, A , Friedman, A , Telang, R , 2006. Is there a cost to privacy breaches? An 
event study. In: ICIS 2006 Proc., p. 94 . 
Anderson, R , Moore, T , 2006. The economics of information security. Science 314 
(5799), 610–613 . 
Anderson, R , Barton, C , Böhme, R , Clayton, R , Van Eeten, MJG , Levi, M , Moore, T , 
Savaga, S. , 2013. Measuring the cost of cybercrime. In: The Economics of Infor- 
mation Security and Privacy. Springer, pp. 265–300 . 
Andrijcic, E , Horowitz, B. , 2006. A macro-economic framework for evaluation of cy- 
ber security risks related to protection of intellectual property. Risk Anal. 26 (4), 
907–923 . 
Anson, W , Suchy, DP , Ahya, C , 2005. Intellectual property valuation: a primer for 
identifying and determining value. Am. Bar Assoc. J . 
Anton, JJ , Yao, DA , 2004. Little patents and big secrets: managing intellectual prop- 
erty. RAND J. Econ. 1–22 . 
Arcuri, MC , Brogi, M , Gandolﬁ, G , 2017. How Does Cyber Crime Affect Firms? The 
Effect of Information Security Breaches on Stock Returns . 
Argento, Z. , 2013. Killing the golden goose: the dangers of strengthening domestic 
trade secret rights in response to cyber-misappropriation. Yale JL Tech. 16, 172 . 
Arundel, A., 2001. The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropria- 
tion. Res. Policy 30 (4), 611–624. Accessed April 4 2018 from: http://linkinghub. 
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0048733300001001 . 
Basuchoudhary, A , Choucri, N. , 2014. The evolution of network based cyber security 
norms: an analytical narrative. In: Information Reuse and Integration (IRI), 2014 
IEEE 15th International Conference on. IEEE, pp. 646–653 . 
Basuchoudhary, A, Eltoweissy, M, Azab, M, Razzolini, L, Mohamed, S, 2015. Cyberde- 
fense when attackers mimic legitimate users: a Bayesian approach. In: 2015 
IEEE International Conference on Information Reuse and Integration, pp. 502–
509. doi: 10.1109/IRI.2015.83 . 
Becker, G.S , 1968. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. In: The Economic 
Dimensions of Crime. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 13–68 . 
Bhattacharya, S, Guriev, S., 2006. Dec. Patents vs. trade secrets: knowledge licensing 
and spillover. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 4 (6), 1112–1147. Available from: http://www. 
mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/JEEA.2006.4.6.1112 . 
Bulut, H, Moschini, G, 2006. Patents, trade secrets and the correlation among R&D 
projects. Econ Lett. 91 (1), 131–137. Available from: http://linkinghub.elsevier. 
com/retrieve/pii/S0165176505003812 . 
Burstein, A , Mulligan, D , 2007. Security Breach Notiﬁcation Laws: Views From Chief 
Security Oﬃcers. A study Conduct Samuelson Law Technol Public Policy Clin 
Univ California-Berkeley Sch Law . 
Carr, C , Gorman, L. , 2001. The revictimization of companies by the stock market who 
report trade secret theft under the Economic Espionage Act. Bus. Lawyer 25–53 . 
Cash, MH , 2015. Keep it secret, keep it safe: protecting trade secrets by revisiting 
the reasonable effort s requirement in Federal Law. J. Intell. Prop. L 23, 263 . 
Cavusoglu, H , Mishra, B , Raghunathan, S , 2004. The effect of internet security breach 
announcements on market value : capital market reactions for breached ﬁrms 
and internet security developers. Int. J. Electron. Commer. 9 (1), 69–104 . 
Cohen W, Nelson R, Walsh J. Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why Firm Patent and Why They Do Not in the American Man- 
ufacturing Sector. NBER Work Pap. 20 0 0: 7552. 
Committe on the Judiciary, 2014. Are Our Laws Adequate for Today’s Threats (On- 
line)Serial No. J–113–59. Available from: HYPERLINK https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CHRG-113shrg96009/pdf/CHRG-113shrg96009.pdf . 
Crass D, Garcia-Valero F, Pitton F, Rammer C. Protecting Innovation Through Patents 
and Trade Secrets: Determinants and Performance Impacts for Firms with a Sin- 
gle Innovation. 2016. 
Cugno, F, Ottoz, E., 2006 Sep. Trade secret vs. broad patent: the role of licensing. 
Rev. Law Econ. 2 (2). Available from: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol2/iss2/art3 . 
Davis, G, Garcia, A, Zhang, W, 2009. Empirical analysis of the effects of cyber secu- 
rity incidents. Risk Anal. 29 (9), 1304–1316. Available from: https://doi.org/10. 
1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01245.x . 
DOJ. Electrical Engineer Found Guilty for Intending to Convert Trade Se- 
crets from Defense Contractor. Press Release (Online). 2018 Jul 10; Avail- 
able from: HYPERLINK https://www.justice.gov/usao- ct/pr/electrical- engineer- 
found- guilty- intending- convert- trade- secrets- defense- contractor . 
Dreyfuss, R , Lobel , 2016. Economic espionage as reality or rhetoric: Equating trade 
secrecy with national security. O Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 20 (2), 419–476 . 
Ettredge, M , Guo, F , Li, Y , 2018. Trade secrets and cyber security breaches. J. Acc. 
Public Policy 37.6 (2018), 564–585 . 
Gordon, LA , Loeb, MP. , 2002. The economics of information security investment. 
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 5 (4), 438–457 . 
Gordon, LA , Loeb, MP , Lucyshyn, W , Zhou, L , 2015a. Externalities and the magnitude 
of cyber security underinvestment by private sector ﬁrms: a modiﬁcation of the 
Gordon-Loeb model. J. Inf. Secur. 6 (1), 24 . 
Gordon, LA , Loeb, MP , Lucyshyn, W , Zhou, L , 2015b. Increasing cyber security in- 
vestments in private sector ﬁrms. J. Cyber. Secur. 1 (1), 3–17 . 
Gordon, LA , Loeb, MP , Zhou, L , 2011. The impact of information security breaches: 
has there been a downward shift in costs? J. Comput. Secur. 19 (1), 33–56 . 
Goverment of the United States, 2013. Administration Strategy on Mitigating the 
Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets Accessed January, 15, 2017 from https://www.justice. 
gov/criminal-ccips/ﬁle/938321/download . 
Government of the United States, 2018. National Cyber Strategy of the United States 
of America (Online). Washington, DC Available from: https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf . 
Hall, B , Helmers, C , Rogers, M , Sena, V , 2014. The choice between formal and infor- 
mal intellectual property: a review. J. Econ. Lit. 52 (2), 375–423 . 
Hilary, G , Segal, B , Zhang , 2016. Cyber-Risk Disclosure: Who Cares? Georg Mc- 
Donough Sch Bus Res Pap No 2852519 . 
Hua, J., Bapna S. The economic impact of cyber terrorism. The Journal of. Strategic 
Strat. Information Inf. Systems Syst. 22.2 (2013): 175–186. 
Kshetri, N. , 2006. The simple economics of cybercrimes. IEEE Secur. Priv. 4 (1), 
33–39 . 
Kultti, K , Takalo, T , Toikka, J , 2007. Secrecy versus patenting. Rand. J. Econ. 38 (1), 
22–42 . 
Kwon, I. , 2012. Patent races with secrecy. J. Ind. Econ. 60 (3), 499–516 . 
Lagazio, M , Sherif, N , Cushman, M , 2014. A multi-level approach to understanding 
the impact of cyber crime on the ﬁnancial sector. Comput. Secur. 45, 58–74 . 
Lewis, M., 2013 Sept. Did Goldman Sachs Overstep in Criminal Charging Its Ex- 
Programmer? Vanity FairAvailable from: HYPERLINK https://www.vanityfair. 
com/news/2013/09/michael-lewis-goldman-sachs-programmer . 
Manshaei, MH , Zhu, Q , Alpcan, T , Bac ¸s ar, T , Hubaux, J-P , 2013. Game theory meets 
network security and privacy. ACM Comput. Surv. 45 (3), 25 . 
McCarty, N , Meirowitz, A , 2007. Political Game Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge 
University Press, New York . 
McMillan, R, Olyaei, S., 2016. Identifying the real information security budget. Gart. 
Res.. Available from: https://www.gartner.com/doc/340 0 017?cm _ sp=swg- _ - 
research- _ -tail . 
Moore, T , Clayton, R , Anderson, R , 2009. The economics of online crime. J. Econ. 
Perspect. 23 (3), 3–20 . 
Moore, T, Dynes, S, Chang, FR, 2015. Identifying How Firms Manage Cyber Security 
Investment, p. 32 Available South Methodist Uni. Available from: http://blog. 
smu.edu/research/ﬁles/2015/10/SMU-IBM.pdf . 
Mosel, M , 2011. Big Patents, Small Secrets: How Firms Protect Inventions When R&D 
Outcome is Heterogeneous BGPE Discussion Paper . 
Orozco, D. , 2012. Amending the economic espionage act to require the disclosure of 
national security-related technology thefts. Cath. UL Rev. 62, 877 . 
Ottoz E, Cugno F. Patent-secret mix in complex product ﬁrms. 2007; American Am. 
Law and Economics Econ. Review Rev. 10.1: 142–158. 
Panagopoulos, A , 2015. Park I-U. Patenting vs. Secrecy For Startups and the Trade of 
Patents As Negotiating Assets. University of Crete mimeo . 
Png, I , Tang, CQ , Wang, Q-H , 2006. Information Security: User Precautions and 
Hacker Targeting. Natl Univ Singapore . 
Png, IPL , 2017a. Law and innovation: evidence from state trade secrets laws. Rev. 
Econ. Stat. 99 (1), 167–179 . 
Png, IPL , 2017b. Secrecy and patents: theory and evidence from the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act. Strateg. Sci. 2 (3), 176–193 . 
Png, IPL , Samila, S , 2013. Trade Secrets Law and Engineer/Scientist Mobility: Evi- 
dence from “Inevitable Disclosure.” WP Nat U Singapore . 
Romanosky, S , Telang, R , Acquisti, A , 2011. Do data breach disclosure laws reduce 
identity theft? J. Policy Anal. Manag. 30 (2), 256–286 . 
Rowe, EA , 2016. RATs, TRAPs, and Trade Secrets. BCL Rev. 57, 381–426 . 
Ruan, K , 2017. Introducing cybernomics: a unifying economic framework for mea- 
suring cyber risk. Comput. Secur. 65, 77–89 . 
Searle, N , Basuchoudhary, A. , 2019. Does One Size Policy Fit All? The Sensitivity of 
Cybercrime Policy to Preferences Working paper . 
Selby, N , 2017. Local Police Don’t Go After Most cybercriminals. We Need Better 
Training. Washington Post . 
Shackelford, SJ. , 2016. Protecting intellectual property and privacy in the digital age: 
the use of national cyber security strategies to mitigate cyber risk. Chap L Rev 
19, 445 . 
Stempel, J., 2017 Jan 24. Ex-goldman programmer’s code theft conviction re- 
vived by New York court. Reuters Bus. News. Available from: https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us- goldman- sachs- aleynikov/ex- goldman- programmers 
- code- theft- conviction- revived-by-new-york-court-idUSKBN1582L0 . 
Von Solms, R , Van Niekerk, J , 2013. From information security to cyber security. 
Comput. Secur. 38, 97–102 . 
Wagner, RE. , 2011. Bailouts and the potential for distortion of federal criminal law: 
industrial espionage and beyond. Tul. L. Rev. 86, 1017 . 
Wei, H , Frincke, D , Alves-Foss, J , Soule, T , Pforsich, H , 2005. A layered decision model 
for cost-effective network defense. In: Information Reuse and Integration, Conf, 
20 05 IRI-20 05 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, pp. 506–511 . 
US v. Sergey Aleynikov: 1:10-cr-0 0 096-DLC. USDC SDNY. 2010. 
USA v. Sparks et al 3:16 −cr −00198 −AWT −1. 2016. 
A. Basuchoudhary and N. Searle / Computers & Security 87 (2019) 101591 13 
Dr. Atin Basuchoudhary Professor, Virginia Military Institute Professor Atin Basu- 
choudhary teaches economics at the Virginia Military Institute. His work applying 
game theory and machine learning techniques to asymmetric information problems 
has been published in Decision Analysis, Public Choice, IEEE Proceedings, Defense 
and Peace Economics, Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, Economics of Peace and Se- 
curity Journal, and Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, among others. 
He has collaborated on two published books applying machine learning to predict 
civil conﬂict and growth. Prof. Basuchoudhary’s research interests range from cyber- 
security, to conﬂict economics, to the evolution of cultures. He has received grants 
to further research from the NSF, John Templeton Foundation, and the Charles Koch 
Foundation. He was interviewed about his work on National Public Radio and has 
been invited to speak at international venues. The Virginia Military Institute and 
the Commonwealth of Virginia has recognized Professor Basuchoudhary as an ac- 
complished teacher. 
Dr. Nicola Searle EPSRC Digital Economy Fellow, Goldsmiths, University of London 
Dr. Nicola Searle is a Digital Economy Fellow and Senior Lecturer at Goldsmiths, 
University of London. An economist who specializes in the economics of intellec- 
tual property, Nicola currently holds a ﬁve-year fellowship, entitled “Economic Es- 
pionage and Cybercrime: Evidence and Strategy.” Her work looks at the increasing 
importance of trade secrets in the digital world, and the emerging threats of the 
theft of trade secrets and economic espionage through cybercrime. Dr. Searle is a 
member of the Research Council UK Digital Economy Program Advisory Board, a 
member of the UK Intellectual Property Oﬃce’s (IPO) Research Experts Advisory 
Group and an Honorary Research Fellow at the School of Management, University 
of St Andrews. She previously held positions at the School of Design and Informat- 
ics at Abertay University. In addition to academic career, she has several years of 
experience as an economist in the UK government and an associate at Goldman 
Sachs. 
